

THE SUBORDINATION OF THE OBLIGATORY SIGN OF CONFORMITY IN THE FALL

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Abstract

Obligatory semantics is a branch of conformist semantics, because it depends mainly on the literal or conformist meaning of sentences. Conformist semantics refers to the direct and clear meaning of words as they appear in linguistic dictionaries.

While the connotative meaning refers to implicit and suggestive meanings that can be inferred from the context and speech; Hence, the obligatory meaning cannot be understood without referring to the corresponding meaning. Here comes the question: If the corresponding meaning of the speech falls, does that mean that the obligatory meaning also falls or not?

Hence, the obligatory meaning cannot be understood without referring to the corresponding meaning. Here comes the question: If the corresponding meaning of the speech falls, does that mean that the obligatory meaning also falls or not? This research Has many fruits in the science of jurisprudence, considering that many of the jurisprudential arguments are based on this point. If evidence is established for the obligation of something, and the corresponding meaning of this news is the obligation, then it reveals the criterion. If we assume that the corresponding meaning is dropped for some reason, Does the angel fall? According to the statement that the obligatory meaning is dependent on the corresponding meaning, then the angel is also not proven. However, if we say that the obligatory meaning is not dependent on the corresponding meaning, then the angel remains proven by the obligatory meaning.

There are many resources in jurisprudence that explore the criterion through discourse. If the discourse is dropped, there is no criterion left on the statement of dependency. As for the statement of non-dependency, then we have an indication of the criterion, which is the obligatory meaning.

Keywords: Conformity, obligatory meaning, dependency, lapse.

Section One: Definition of meaning

It contains two requirements:

The first requirement: defining meaning in language:

In the Arabic language, the word “dala” has several meanings, from which we can choose.

1- Clarity and appearance: Ahmad said: “Dal and Lam are two roots: One of them is: clarifying something with an indication that you learn, and the other is confusion in something. The first is their saying: I showed so-and-so the way. And evidence is the indication in something. And it is clear in indication and evidence” (Ibn Faris, 1999, vol.2, p.259).

2- Guidance: It was mentioned in the Intermediate Dictionary that the meaning is: “Guidance. And what the word requires when it is used” (Ibrahim Anis, 2003, p.324).

We chose these two definitions because the well-known concept of meaning in the language of the people is: clarification and guidance.

The second requirement: Definition of meaning in terminology

The interest of scholars in the subject of semantics varies according to the differences in their arts, and among those who were the first to explain semantics technically were the scholars of logic, because the science of semantics is more closely related to logic than to other sciences. Hence, we find the author of the book Al-Taqreer wa Al-Tanweer referring to this by saying: “The practical habit of logicians is to divide it” (Ibn Amir Al-Hajj, 1999, vol.1, p.99).

General significance has been defined by a set of definitions, the most famous of which is: “That something is in a state in which knowledge of it necessitates knowledge of something else” (Al-Jurjani, 2003, p.172).

The second section: Sections of meaning and the difference between the fundamentalists and logicians in the obligatory meaning.

The first requirement: Sections of evidence

Semantics has been divided into several divisions based on different considerations, the most famous of which is dividing it into verbal semantics and non-verbal semantics, each of which is either situational, natural, or rational.

What concerns us in this research is situational verbal semantics; and the research will be limited to it.

Definition of verbal semantic meaning: There are different definitions of it, and we will choose two of them.

1- What Al-Zarkashi chose: “It is the word being such that If the word is uttered, the meaning is understood from it by whoever is knowledgeable about its being used for it” (Al-Zarkashi, 1992, vol. 2, p.36).

2- What is the relationship between Al-Zarkashi and Ibn Sina: “It is the same understanding” (Al-Zarkashi, vol.2, p.36).

Sections of verbal semantics: Logicians, and the scholars of the principles of jurisprudence agreed with them, divided the meaning of the word into three sections, which are: A- The meaning of conformity, or the meaning of conformity: It is the meaning of the word to the completeness of its meaning. It is called this because the signifier matches the signified, such as the meaning of a human to a speaking animal.

B- The implication or the implied implication: It is the implication of the word for a named part, such as the implication of the house for the roof which is a part of it.

C- The implication of commitment or the implication of commitment: It is the implication of the word as a necessary consequence of its name, such as the implication of the ceiling as a wall (Al-Ghazali, 2006, vol.1, p.92).

The second requirement: The difference between fundamentalists and logicians in the obligatory meaning

Although they agreed in general on the division, some scholars of the principles of jurisprudence differed in the division of meaning. Al-Shatibi, for example, divided it into two parts: original meaning and subsidiary meaning. He said: “For speech, in terms of its indication of the original meaning, and in terms of its indication of the subsidiary meaning that is a servant of the original” (Al-Shatibi, 1997, vol.2, p.105).

Commitment in the language: the source of the verb “To commit to something”, “if one adheres to something and does not leave it” (Al-Fayruzabadi, 2005, p.1158).

Technically: “The meaning of a word is that which is mentally consistent with what it was intended for” (Al-Qarafi, 1393 AH, p.24).

This necessary consequence may be mental and external, such as the necessity of the pairing of four, or it may be mental only, such as the necessity of sight and blindness, or it may be external only, such as the necessity of the raven and blackness. These are three forms of necessity, in the first two of which it is clear, and in the last it is not clear because the mind is devoid of it (Al-Qarafi, p.24). The logicians stipulate that the meaning of a word as a necessary consequence must be clear, so they explicitly stipulate that the consequence must be mental, whether it is also external or not. Al-Damanhouri mentioned this, saying: "He indicated that the necessary Consequence must be necessary in the mind, whether it is also external. As necessary for the pairing of four, or not, as necessary for sight for blindness." (Al-Damanhouri, 2006, p.41).

As for the fundamentalists, Al-Damanhouri reported that this was not a condition. He said: "As for if it is only necessary in the external world, like the blackness of a crow, then understanding it from the word is not called an indication of obligation according to logicians, even if it is called that according to the fundamentalists" (Al-Damanhouri, p.42).

There is a difference between the view of logicians and fundamentalists on the obligatory meaning. Logicians look at the origin of existence, meaning the existence of obligatory meaning is a branch of the existence of corresponding meaning in terms of the origin of existence, and there cannot be an obligatory meaning without the existence of corresponding meaning.

The point is clear in this, as the word must, in the first stage, indicate its meaning, so that it may indicate the necessary consequence of its meaning. But if it does not indicate its meaning, how can it indicate the necessary consequence?! Indicating the necessary consequence of the meaning is a branch of indicating the original meaning.

This contrasts with the science of Usul, as the Usuli scholar accepts that the obligatory indication in terms of existence is a branch of the corresponding indication, but the discussion is about whether if the corresponding is dropped, not from the origin of existence, but from the authority, then does the obligatory indication drop from the authority? The perspective of the Usuli scholar is the authority. While the perspective of the logical origin is the origin of existence, the argument is far from it.

Research site in fundamentalist studies: There is research that if the conformity of the verbal evidence is dropped from the authority, does the obligatory

evidence also drop the authority or not? That is, the evidence has two meanings, conformity and obligatory. The conformity has been dropped by the authority, so does the obligation drop from the authority or not? To clarify the requirement, we will mention some examples:

The first example: If the person responsible enters the mosque and sees impurity in it, and we put the aspect of “remove” Before “pray”, and it is appropriate at that time for the person responsible to be busy with removing, but he does not occupy himself with that, and is busy with the prayer, is it possible to correct his prayer with the criterion? That is, we say that there was an interest and an obligation in the prayer, and the obligation was dropped because of (azal), but the reason for it to be dropped is not there, so it remains as it is, based on dependency, since the indication of the obligation was dropped from the authority, so it is necessary for its indication of the reason to be dropped. As for based on the lack of dependency, it is reasonable to say that it can be corrected by angels.

The second example: If it is assumed that ablution would harm a person, then in that case, it is ruled that the obligation is lifted from him based on the principle of no harm or no hardship, but the person obligated to perform ablution was forced to do so with complete difficulty, so is his ablution valid Or not? Someone might say: The ablution is valid because the rule of “No harm” or “no hardship” Removes the obligation. As for the criterion, it does not remove it, so it is possible then to draw near to God through the criterion, and the ablution is then ruled to be valid.

This statement is since the obligatory indication does not follow the corresponding indication in terms of validity. However, if we say that it is dependent, this is not possible, since what indicates the criterion is the command. When the command indicates obligation, the necessary consequence of the obligation - that is, the necessary consequence of the corresponding indication - is the existence of interest.

Now that the obligation has been dropped due to harm, who said that there is a criterion?! Based on the idea of Dependency, it is appropriate Not to rule that ablution is valid because there is nothing that indicates the criterion. However, based on the lack of dependency, ablution is valid. Because the obligation has been dropped, and the narration’s indication of the obligation has been dropped

from its validity due to “no harm.” As for the indication of the criterion, there is no reason for it to be dropped.

Third example: If a boy wants to pray, fast, or something else, can his prayer be corrected or not? One of the ways to correct the prayer is to command with a command, meaning (if they reach seven or nine, command them to pray) and command with a command is a command to do that thing. This means that prayer is commanded for the boy by God Almighty, so the command is to correct the prayer and the father’s role is that of the one who conveys the message and the intermediary, not that the command is directed to him, but rather the command is directed to him as an intermediary, otherwise it is directed to the son when he reaches seven years of age, There is another way to correct the boy’s prayer: which is to say that the Almighty’s saying (O you who believe, decreed upon you is fasting) or (Establish prayer), or other than that, we adhere to these commands with regard to the boy, because the hadith of the lifting of the pen lifts the obligation, so the obligation is lifted by the hadith of the lifting of the pen.

The corresponding meaning is removed, and the obligatory meaning - I mean the criterion - remains as it is based on the lack of dependency. If we build on the lack of dependency, then the criterion remains, and it is possible to approach it. If we build on dependency, then it is not possible to approach it with the criterion due to the lack of something that reveals it.

Thus, it became clear that this issue has important consequences. So, this is a significant result, and we can say that this issue is one of the rules that are used in the position of deduction and is not just a benefit.

By clarifying the purpose of this issue, our discussion falls into: This research should be specialized and its scope narrowed to whether the obligatory meaning is more general than the corresponding meaning, not whether it is equal.

The third topic: investigating the issue

To investigate the issue, we say: The obligatory meaning is divided into two parts:

The first section: equivalent to the corresponding meaning: such as if an informant reported the sunrise, this indicates by implication the existence of daylight. If it is known that the news is false and that its corresponding meaning

is invalid, it is known that its obligatory meaning is also invalid, which is that daylight has not yet risen.

If: In the case of equality of the obligatory meaning to the conformity, the fall of the emirate from the authority in its conformity meaning leads to its fall in its obligatory meaning as well, and this research was not addressed by the scholars of the principles of jurisprudence because they agreed on it.

The second section: The most general of the corresponding meaning: It is that which is true in its right that if the necessary is found, the necessary is found. However, if the necessity is lost, it is not necessary for the necessity to be lost because it is possible for there to be another cause upon which the necessity is found. An example of this is the effect in relation to one of its causes, such as death by burning in relation to Zayd's entry into the fire. If someone informs about Zayd's entry into the fire, then the implied meaning has a special share of death, which is death by burning, because this is the side of the implication of entering the fire. If it becomes clear that the literal meaning is not proven, which is the proof of death by burning, this does not mean that Zaid did not die, because death was not limited to burning. He may have died by drinking poison or by any other reason. Then, if the evidence is no longer valid in its literal meaning for any reason, does its validity also fall in the obligatory meaning, which is Zaid's death?

Sayings on the issue:

The first statement: The non-subordination of the obligatory meaning to conformity in terms of validity Al-Mirza al-Na'ini adopted this statement in *Fawa'id al-Usul*, where he said: "And the idea that the obligatory indication is a branch of the corresponding indication, and after the two conflicting things fall in the corresponding meaning, there is no room for the obligatory indication to remain for them in negating the third, is invalid; The obligatory indication is a branch of the corresponding indication in existence, not in authority" (Al-Na'ini, 1438 AH, vol.4, p.755).

Al-Mirza al-Na'ini believes that the mere branching of the obligatory meaning from the conformity is not sufficient to justify its branching from it in the authority as well; because after he found an obligatory meaning for the conformity meaning, we now have two individuals from the evidence of the authority, the conformity meaning and the obligatory meaning. The omission of

one of them from the evidence of authority does not entail the omission of the other individual.

Mr. Al-Khoei's discussion of what Mirza Al-Na'ini stated: It contains what we have mentioned more than once, that the necessary is subordinate to the entailed in terms of its authority as well. It is also subordinate to it according to the level of proof and assertion. As for what he mentioned regarding the reason for the necessity's authority not being dropped, we will respond to it sometimes with refutation and other times with solution. As for the refutation in cases: including: if evidence is established that a drop of urine fell on a garment, for example, and we know that the evidence is false and that urine did not fall on the garment, but we assume that the garment is Impure due to something else, such as blood falling on it, for example, is it possible to rule that the garment is impure because of the aforementioned evidence? Considering that reporting that urine fell on a garment is reporting that it is impure, because it is necessary for urine to fall on it. And after the evidence falls from being binding in the necessary due to knowledge of the difference, there is no objection to referring to it about the necessary. And we do not think that a jurist would adhere to it. Among them: What if there was a house under the control of Zaid, Amr and Bakr claimed it, so evidence was presented that it belonged to Amr, and other evidence that it belonged to Bakr. So, after they were dropped in their corresponding meaning due to the opposition, can we take them into account in their binding meaning, and rule that the house does not belong to Zaid, and that its owner is unknown? Among them: What if the witness informed that the house belongs to Amr, and Amr admitted that it does not belong to him, then the evidence is no longer valid, because the admission takes precedence over it, just as it takes precedence over possession. So, after the evidence is no longer valid in the literal meaning of the admission, is it possible to take its obligatory meaning? Is it that the house does not belong to Zayd, even though it is under his control? And other cases in which a jurist or scholar is not obligated to take the necessary action (Al-Khoei, 1422 AH, b, vol.2, p.443).

It is concluded from what Mr. Al-Khoei said: It is not possible to take the obligatory meaning into account in any of the above-mentioned cases, and the like, after the corresponding meaning has fallen into place. He added: As for the solution, it is that the information about the necessary, even if it is information about the necessary, it is not information about the necessary by the existence of

the effort, but rather information about a special share that is necessary for it, because the information about urine falling on the garment is not information about the impurity of the garment for any reason. Rather, it is news about his impurity caused by urine falling on him. So, after knowing that the evidence is false in its report about urine falling on the garment, it is inevitably known that it is false in its report about the impurity of the garment. As for impurity due to another reason, even if it is possible, it is completely outside the meaning of the evidence. Likewise, in this case, the report indicating obligation indicates a portion of impermissibility that is necessary for obligation, not impermissibility in an absolute statement. The report indicating prohibition indicates impermissibility that is necessary for prohibition, not absolute impermissibility. So, with their falling from being authoritative in their meaning corresponding to the opposition, they are also invalidated in the obligatory sense, and this is the case in all the examples we mentioned. The testimony of the witness that the house belongs to Amr is testimony of a share of it not being Zayd's, which is necessary for it to belong to Amr. And so is the testimony that it belongs to Bakr. After they fall in the corresponding meaning, they also fall in the obligatory meaning (Al-Khoei, 1422 AH, b, vol.2, p.444).

The second statement: The dependence of the obligatory meaning on conformity in the authority: This is the famous statement among the scholars of the principles of jurisprudence, considering that the branching in existence necessitates the branching in the authority, and this branching is approached in one of two ways: The first aspect: What Mr. Al-Khoei mentioned, of always referring the more general obligatory meaning to an equal obligatory meaning, as the obligatory meaning may be more general than the corresponding meaning, for whoever informed of Zayd's entry into Hell correspondingly informed of his death obligatorily, but his death is more general than his entry into Hell. If he may die by poison, drowning, or any other reason, but what the informant has informed us about is a special share of death, which is death due to entering the fire, and he does not inform us about death at all. With this example, it becomes clear that the necessary may be more general than the required, but in the position of indication, the necessary is always equal to it. In other words, the necessary self, even if it is sometimes more general, is always equal to the corresponding meaning as it is an obligatory meaning, and its establishment without it is inconceivable. So, the death of Zayd, even if it is more general than

his burning in the fire but whoever reports that he was burned by conformity is not reporting a commitment to death in general, even if it was by poison. Rather, its committed meaning is death resulting from burning. So, if we know that there was no burning, how do we act on the committed meaning? The appearance of speech in its implied meaning, even if it is different from its appearance in its corresponding meaning, its appearance in the establishment of the implied meaning is not in an absolute manner, but rather it is apparent in the establishment of a special portion of it, which is the portion inherent in the corresponding meaning. For example: reporting that a garment has met urine, even if it is also reporting that it is impure, it is not reporting that it is impure at all for any reason, but rather reporting a specific portion of impurity, which is the portion that accompanies contact with urine. Meaning that it is a statement about its impurity caused by its contact with urine, as opposed to its impurity caused by its contact with blood or something similar. So, if it is said that this garment is impure, what is meant by that is that it is impure due to urinary impurity. Then, if the lie of the evidence in its statement about the garment's contact with urine becomes apparent, He will inevitably know that she lied when she told him that the garment was impure due to its contact with urine. As for its impurity, due to another reason, even if it is possible, it is another impurity that is completely foreign to the meaning of the evidence. Accordingly, how can we take the obligatory indication after the corresponding indication has fallen? From this it becomes clear: The state of the rest of the examples and other resources, including what we are dealing with, is that what indicates the obligation of an action is not restricted by ability, even if it indicates that it has a binding criterion as such, except that its indication of it having a criterion is not in an absolute manner, even when disregarding its indication of its obligation. Rather, it is dependent on its indication of the necessity of that, so it indicates a special share of the criterion, which is the share that accompanies that obligation in the position of proof and revelation, and it does not indicate the existence of the criterion in it at all. Therefore, if its indication of obligation falls due to an obstacle, then its indication of the criterion caused by its indication of obligation does not remain. Therefore, we have no knowledge of the existence of the criterion in it, because knowledge of the criterion follows knowledge of obligation. If obligation falls, then knowledge of obligation falls inevitably, because it is caused by it. It is not reasonable for the cause to remain without

justification and reason. There is no difference in this between the obligation falling completely and the absolute falling of it.

Its secret: What you know is that reporting the obligation of something is reporting the existence of a special share of the angel in it, which is the share that accompanies its obligation, not its absolute existence in it. And it is not possible for reporting it to be in a broader form than reporting the obligation, because that is contrary to what is assumed, since what is assumed is that it is necessary for it in the place of proof. Knowledge of it revolves around the breadth and narrowness of knowledge of obligation. Accordingly, if obligation is restricted to a specific portion of the action, which is the portion that is possible, for example, then the criterion is not revealed except in that portion, not in the general part of it or in others. This is very clear. Perhaps the one who says that the fall of the corresponding meaning does not entail the fall of the obligatory meaning imagined that the establishment of the obligatory meaning after the establishment of the corresponding meaning would be in a manner of breadth and absoluteness, and the consequence of that is that it does not fall with the fall of the corresponding meaning, except that this is an oversight on his part. It is assumed that whoever reported the establishment of the corresponding meaning reported the establishment of a specific portion of it, which is the portion that accompanies it, not its establishment absolutely (Al-Khoei, 1422 AH, a, vol.2, p.367).

The response of Sayyid al-Shahid to Sayyid al-Khoei: Your words are correct in the manner of a partial affirmative, not a general one. Sometimes the necessary consequence occurs in the necessary consequence, which is a share, as in the example of Zayd entering the fire. Here the informant is not informing about absolute death, but about a specific share of it. Hence, if the corresponding meaning is dropped, the obligatory meaning is dropped; because this obligatory meaning, even if it is more general, the informant always informs about a special share, but the examples that are not between the two sides of the concomitant, and the causative, this statement is not correct, as if there is an impediment between them, such as saying: Either the body Is white or black, so white and black cannot come together in one body, but they can be elevated in a red body, for example. So, when we say blackness is the opposite of whiteness, what is meant is that the essence of blackness is the opposite of whiteness, not a special share of it, but after the whiteness is realized on the paper - for example - We

say this paper is white, not black. The answer of the martyred Sayyid can be summarized as follows: Sometimes the implication occurs after the necessary is specialized, so here what Sayyid al-Khoei mentioned is complete, and other times the specialization arises from the implication itself, so in some examples he speaks about the necessary itself and not about a specific portion of it, so the claim (that every necessary is more general and is equal) True in a partial affirmative manner. Thus, the partial negative is proven to be true, which is that some solutions are not of the type of equal necessary premises, and thus the invalidity of the major premise that Sayyid al-Khoei used as evidence is proven. Sayyid al-Shaheed al-Sadr said: "This is only achieved in the obligatory solutions that have a specialization and are determined in themselves, regardless of the comparison drawn with regard to the corresponding meaning, so they are in themselves something that does not come together with the meaning in the other proof." (Al-Shahroudi, 1426 AH, vol.7, p.262).

But if it does not have a specificity like that, then this aspect is not complete, because the implied meaning at that time is the necessary essence, and the implied indication is an indication of it as it is, not as the necessary conjunction, so the connection is a relation between the two connected things. It is not taken in either of the two parties, so with the fall of the corresponding indication of the authority and it's not being included in the general evidence of the authority, there is no objection to the obligatory indication of the speech remaining on its authority as long as their meaning is likely to be proven in itself and the indication of it is preserved in essence and existence. It is strange that the martyred Sayyid does not accept here what Sayyid Abu al-Qasim al-Khoei went to, of returning all obligatory meanings to equivalent meanings, and at the same time he adopts this statement in his jurisprudential research. He said: "If the error of the informant is assumed in the corresponding meaning, then assuming the invalidity of the obligatory meaning does not necessitate another error to negate, by the principle of the absence of additional error, falsehood, or confusion. This statement, however, is only reasonable if the corresponding indication is no longer valid due to the existence of an opposing argument or due to knowledge of the invalidity of the corresponding indication, not if the failure to establish the corresponding indication is due to a deficiency in the evidence itself of validity in establishing it and including it, as in the case. Since the subject of the evidence of the authority is the title of the evidence and what the two witnesses

reported, and each of the two identical meanings in the hypothesis was not reported by the two witnesses, then its failure to be proven is due to the lack of truth of the title of the evidence, which is the evidence, on each of the two remaining meanings. In such a case, there remains no objection to applying the evidence of authority to the obligatory meaning if the title of authority is true for it because it is narrated by both testimonies, even if it is an obligation" (al-Sadr, 1421 AH, vol.4, pp.133-134).

The second aspect: It is for Sayyid al-Shahid al-Sadr, and this aspect is based on what Sayyid al-Shahid said about the logical foundations of induction, and its gist is: If an informant tells a piece of news, then the person will have a certain degree of suspicion that what he told will happen. If a second informant comes and tells the same piece of news, then the degree of probability will increase. Thus, the degree of probability increases as the number of informants increases until we reach certainty. If a hundred informants report the occurrence of an incident, and we assume that certainty has been achieved with this number of reports, then if it is proven that one of the informants lied, then one degree will be reduced from the assumed hundred. This does not affect the ninety-nine degrees of truthfulness, considering that the lie of one informant in and of itself does not necessarily entail the lie of the second informant, and to prove the lie of the second informant we need new effort and evidence, and so if it is proven that a second informant is lying, this also does not affect the third informant. This is different from what we are dealing with. If someone reported that Zayd fell into the fire, and we knew that he lied in the literal meaning, then if we wanted to lie in the implied meaning as well, we would not need a new effort. In other words: If we know that someone informed us of the literal meaning of Zayd's falling into the fire, then by implication he informed us of his death. If it is proven that the corresponding meaning was false, then to prove the falsehood of the obligatory meaning as well, the same previous evidence - which is the falsehood and previous suspicion - is sufficient to invalidate the obligatory meaning, and we do not need new evidence. This is in contrast to the case of multiple informants; that is, if one person informs that Zayd has fallen into the fire, and a second person informs that Zayd has fallen into the fire, then if the lie of the first is proven, the lie of the second is not proven, because the lie of the second requires a new denial, whereas the denial of the obligatory meaning does not require a new denial.

The fruit of research

This research has many fruits in the science of jurisprudence, considering that many of the jurisprudential inferences are based on this point. If evidence is established for the existence of something and the corresponding meaning of this news is obligation, then it reveals the criterion. If we assume that the corresponding meaning is dropped for some reason, Will the angel fall?

On the statement that the obligatory meaning is dependent on the corresponding meaning, there is also no evidence for the criterion. However, if we say that the obligatory meaning is not dependent on the corresponding meaning, then the criterion remains established by the obligatory meaning. There are many resources in jurisprudence in which the criterion is explored through discourse. If the discourse is dropped, there is no criterion left for the statement of dependency. As for the statement of non-dependency, then we have an indication of the criterion, which is the obligatory meaning.

Results

The correlation between the fall of the corresponding meaning and the obligatory meaning is one of the fundamental topics and includes the main important result.

1- Subordination: If the corresponding meaning is invalid, then the obligatory meaning is also invalid, because the argument based on it is the same as the argument of the two meanings.

2- If the obligatory meaning is more general than the corresponding meaning, here the fall of the corresponding meaning does not lead to the fall of the meaning. It is identical unless there is other evidence of its invalidity.

3- If the obligatory meaning is derived from the corresponding meaning in terms of validity, then the fall of the corresponding meaning leads to the fall of the obligatory meaning.

The proposal

I suggest expanding and diversifying the study of this research because it includes linguistics, logic, and etymology. For example, in linguistics, it can investigate the development of linguistic theories related to semantics. Especially those that study the relationship between explicit and implicit meaning and how the fall of the corresponding meaning affects the

understanding of metaphor and simile, which rely heavily on the obligatory meaning.

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